A Road Map for the Islamization for the Human Sciences

Republished: An Interview with Allameh Misbah Yazdi (Part Five)

Subject of the event: Islamic Human Sciences

Location: Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute, Qom, Iran

Date: 1389 S.H. (2010)

Q: Are the human sciences also empirical in their methodology? If so, wouldn‘t that undermine the bifurcation of science into human and natural?

Many of the human sciences partake of an empirical methodology. Of course, other than physiological psychology, the subject of the human sciences is imperceptible to sensory observation; it is only their effects that can be perceived. This is especially true of those sciences that deal with the human psyche, in which case applying the designation of “natural science” would definitely be incorrect. Such sciences are without doubt a part of the human sciences. But although they are treated as human sciences, many of them employ empirical methodology.

It is for this reason that, in my view, classification of sciences is primarily a matter of convention and therefore does not merit serious scholarly debate. Of course, when we actually set out to classify the sciences, we must ascertain what our chosen criterion is in dividing the sciences into two or three or so categories.

One of the best existing classifications is probably that offered by philosophers of science, which takes as its criterion the methods of investigation of the sciences, thereby identifying three categories: the narrative (naqlī), the speculative (‘aqlī), the empirical (tajribī). This classification seems more reasonable but does not cohere exactly with the human–natural bifurcation of science.

In spite of all the effort that has been put into the classification of knowledge since Aristotle and the various books produced to this end, it is my conviction that this topic eludes serious scholarly debate. There is no significant scientific motive that would compel us to engage in scholarly debate for settling the issue of the classification of science. Ultimately, it is the peculiar personal and collective motives that determine the criterion of classification. Thus, everyone has an equal right to select and abide by a distinct choice of criterion. None of the resultant criteria may justifiably be dismissed as erroneous, although each demarcates the terms involved in a certain way, offering a unique approach. If you ask, “Why did you choose this particular classification?” the advocates could legitimately reply, “In presenting this particular classification, we were mainly concerned with such and such sciences, which favored this particular classification.” It would be wrong to criticize them for their choice, for ultimately it is only a matter of appellation, and it is futile to debate one‘s choice of appellation. Therefore, I don‘t have a particular definition for the human sciences, but if I were pressed to make a stance, I would assume classification based on methodology to be more appropriate and there I would side with the three–fold categorization of science into the narrative, the speculative, and the empirical.

Q: You alluded to the philosophers of human science who have defined the human sciences as those sciences whose subject–matter is meaningful experience. That is, in opposition to the empiricists, who believed that all disciplines including the human sciences must be subjected to empirical observation, the philosophers in question maintained that human sciences ought to be exempted from this general assertion.

As such, their reasoning for why the human sciences partake of a non–empirical methodology was that the distinctive nature of their subject–matter required a distinct method of investigation. The fundamental reason for this is that the subject–matter of the human sciences is not any human experience; it is rather “meaningful” human experience. Thus, instead of investigating the physical causes of experience, the purpose should be to discover its meaning. As the interior meaning of experience is inaccessible to empirical observation, the methodology of the human sciences differs from that of the natural sciences: It is hermeneutic and interpretive (Verstehen)–seeking to understand the meaning and purpose of human experience–rather than explanative (Erklaren)–which is the methodology of empirical science, which seeks to account for the causes of phenomena.

Therefore, what led them to envisage a distinct subject–matter for the human sciences was their peculiar methodology. You stated that the classification that you believe can satisfactorily distinguish the sciences is one based on methodology. Is it correct to assume a correlation between a methodological classification and a thematic classification and that the former could lead to the latter?

If you mean that in the classification of sciences based on methodology (one constituent methodology being speculative), the human sciences should fall under the speculative methodology, this would seem to disagree with the common definition of the methodology of investigation of meaningful experience. Furthermore, human experience does not constitute the subject–matter of all human sciences. The subject of philosophy and philosophical anthropology, for instance, is not experience, whether it be meaningful or not. It is, of course, possible that one should contend that the human sciences are specifically those whose subject–matter is human experience. But this would only serve as a new designation that would simply evade the question rather than solve it.

A third and more fundamental point is what is intended by “meaningful experience.” If meaningful experience is purposive experience, animal behavior should also be included, for it too–though to a lesser extent–partakes of purpose. We clearly observe purposive behavior in dolphins, ants, etc. This shows that “meaningfulness” is itself a vague and ambiguous term, and employing such terms fails to really address the problem. So, for one thing, the subject–matter of the human sciences is broader than human experience; second, “meaningfulness” is not a distinctive feature of human sciences; and third, Verstehen is not tantamount to the speculative methodology I have alluded to.

Interviewers:

Dr. Mohammad Fanaei, PhD in Philosophy of Religion, Full professor of Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute

Dr. Ali Mesbah, Doctor of Philosophy of Religion, Associate Professor of Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute

Dr. Mahmoud Namazi Esfahani, PhD in Philosophy of Religion, Assistant Professor of Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute