A Road Map for the Islamization for the Human Sciences

 An Interview with Allameh Misbah Yazdi (Part Six)

Subject of the event: Islamic Human Sciences

Location: Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute, Qom, Iran

Date: 1389 S.H. (2010)

Q: The philosophers mentioned above, posit an “interpretive” methodology for the human sciences. They refuse to admit the speculative and rational methodology as characterizing the human sciences.

Again, if we adopt a tripartite division of science based on methodology, it would not correspond to this “interpretive” methodology.

Q: Does this imply that the interpretive methodology could be placed alongside the three you mentioned above as a fourth member of the division?

The interpretive methodology may be understood as corresponding to one of the three, as being subsumed by one of the three, or as a fourth addition, thereby pitting “interpretation” against “rational speculation.” It all depends on the standpoint of the person that is stipulating the division. If we contend that any science that is related to the human being is “human,” the criterion would be the human being as such. As a result, all discussions relating to astral phenomena would be excluded from the purview of human science (although obviously its comprehension relies on the human mind). Similarly, physics and mathematics would be excluded unless we deem the subject of mathematical propositions as secondary inelligibles.

This illustrates, once again, that it is impracticable to present a logically coherent and exhaustive classification of science based on a single criterion. Of course, it is true that those who maintain a peculiar methodology for studying the meaning of human experience that is different from the narrative, speculative, and empirical methodologies may legitimately claim to present a coherent and exhaustive classification, but it should be born in mind that the coherence and exhaustiveness of this classification hinges exclusively on their distinct standpoint and so is incapable of satisfying all the various perspectives that bear on this question. Furthermore, the said classification is itself plagued by inherent problems that undermine its cohesion and exhaustiveness.

Q: In your view, is it correct to postulate the interpretive methodology as a fourth methodology alongside the narrative, empirical, and speculative methodologies (“interpretive” here understood to signify the method of construing the meaning of other human beings‘ behavior, speech, and writing)?

This methodology is actually a combination of multiple methodologies. Of course, my philosophical position is that all methodologies ultimately go back to the rational/speculative methodology. Even the empirical methodology requires that sensory observation be complemented by a general rational premise in order to constitute knowledge. The narrative methodology also relies on the rational speculative methodology, for it presupposes a general premise to the effect that when all the narrators of an event concur in its narration, the possibility of collusion is necessarily eliminated, and where such a consensus is lacking, the narration must be traced back to a reliable authority whose veracity we are certain of; otherwise, historical narration would fail to produce knowledge. Likewise, the process of interpretation depends on rational premises if it is to furnish genuine knowledge. It is very unlikely that we could envisage a science that is independent of either empirical observation, rational speculation, or convention.

Q: What about sciences that rest on human agreement?

If it is based on human agreement, it is conventional. It is my view that all classifications of science are conventional.

Q: But would it be correct to recognize convention as a fourth methodology alongside the three you have spoken of?

It depends on whether we define science as the discovery of objective truth or not. It is in the context of epistemology that we ought to inquire into the definition and criterion of science. And this demonstrates that epistemology–regardless of whether we label it as science, philosophy, or any other similar rubric–is the foundation of all science.

Q: It seems that you have addressed the first two parts of our questions. The next question is this: Are there human sciences that serve as the basis on which other human sciences ought to be worked out?

So far, it was explained that the definition of human science is conventional. Everyone has the right to offer a different definition based on his purpose in classifying the sciences, and thus all definitions are equally correct, unless the alleged criterion is at odds with the definition presented or the definition falls short of being exhaustive, in which case it would simply be objected that the definition is defective and must be revised so as to duly include all the human sciences and exclude all those sciences that are considered non–human based on the standpoint of the person offering the definition.

But in any case, I think such discussions on the choice of one‘s definitions are neither scientific nor philosophic, unless we extend the definition of science to include matters of convention as well. If we do espouse such an extended definition of science, then to enumerate the various definitions of science and to study the history and background of these definitions and the points of disagreement involved would constitute science. Nevertheless, it would still be impossible to make a definitive judgment.

I remarked in the course of the previous answers in this interview that philosophical anthropology, epistemology, philosophy, and theology form the basis on which the rest of the human sciences are structured. If we understand theology as the doctrines and tenets of a certain religion, theology would then be unfitting to serve as the basis of all human sciences. In fact, it would be irrelevant to most human sciences. But if we intend natural theology, which deals with questions concerning God by recourse to reason, then it would form a part of philosophy, not a distinct discipline. But in any case, theology cannot be ranked among the sciences that serve as the basis of all human sciences.

If we compare philosophy, philosophical anthropology, and epistemology, the latter is without doubt the most fundamental of all. Moreover, traditional philosophers regard metaphysics–or “first philosophy”–as the mother of all sciences, not just human sciences. Thus, epistemology and metaphysics are the basis of all sciences. If we deem the title “science” as befitting these two disciplines, we ought to say that these two sciences are the basis of all other sciences. Furthermore, we may remark that philosophical anthropology is the basis of all human sciences. (In so doing–it should be pointed out–we would have to allow ourselves a slight degree of inaccuracy in the definition of human science, for we have so far not settled whether it would be permissible to include certain crafts and skills in the fold of the human sciences or not.)

Therefore, to consider a science as basic, it would suffice that it serve as the basis of a number of other sciences: it need not serve as the basis of all sciences. Thus, we could say that the question of basicness is a matter of gradation: some sciences are basic relative to all sciences and some are so relative to only a group of sciences. It ought to be pointed out that even mathematics is not basic in reference to all sciences, or mathematics need not presuppose metaphysics. We must, in conclusion, remark that epistemology and metaphysics are basic relative to all sciences and that philosophical anthropology is basic in relation to all human sciences.

Interviewers:

Dr. Mohammad Fanaei, PhD in Philosophy of Religion, Professor at the Imam Khomeini Institute for Education and Research

Hujjat al-Islam Dr. Ali Mesbah, PhD in Philosophy of Religion, Associate Professor at the Imam Khomeini Institute for Education and Research

Hujjat al-Islam Dr. Mahmoud Namazi Esfahani, PhD in Philosophy of Religion, Assistant Professor at the Imam Khomeini Institute for Education and Research