A Road Map for the Islamization for the Human Sciences

An Interview with Allameh Misbah Yazdi (Part Four)

Subject of the event: Islamic Human Sciences

Location: Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute, Qom, Iran

Date: 1389 S.H. (2010)

Q: Is it correct to count epistemology and philosophy among the human sciences?

In order to offer a definition of the human sciences, we must first determine our definition of science. The first step is to address our differences with the positivists, and this naturally depends on epistemology. During a certain period, the prevalent intellectual tendency was to consider non–empirical knowledge as either untrue or, at the very least, incapable of being conveyed and communicated. Considering whether the sole scientific methodology is sensory experience or not pertains to the discipline of epistemology; and so is the question of whether scientific knowledge is in fact superior to and more valuable than rational knowledge. We are then led to ask whether reflecting on knowledge itself constitutes science.

In this brief explanation we may find the answer to one of the questions; that is, epistemology is a science that is fundamental in relation to other sciences. Without first settling this question, it would be wrong to proceed with other questions.

Therefore, we must first clarify in what terms we define science. Does any credible and reliable knowledge constitute science or only credible and reliable knowledge the results from sensory experience? If we side with the latter point of view, the majority of the human sciences would be excluded from the scope of “science.” But should we opt for the first and broader definition, we would be compelled to determine to which category of science philosophy belongs and to explain how we may define the human sciences in a way that would include philosophy.

Classifying philosophy along with the human sciences requires that we should first acknowledge that philosophy is a science. Consequently, our definition of science must naturally be broader and more comprehensive in scope than the positivistic definition. Thus, prior to defining the human sciences, we must come to a conclusion as to the definition of science, and then consider what “human” signifies when used to describe science. And we must reserve for epistemology such questions as whether science is restricted to knowledge that obtains by means of sensory experience? whether non–empirical science may legitimately subsume narrative and rational knowledge? and whether it is legitimate to bring religion and revelation to bear on scientific studies?

Q: Having assumed that the human sciences do in fact constitute science, the question that arises is why in the first place were these particular sciences qualified by the adjective “human” and what are the implications of this qualification?

It is up to us to determine what the adjective “human” signifies. But a purely verbal examination is inadequate in addressing problems. The slightest occasion suffices in justifying matters of appellation and so if a science is in any meaningful way related to the human being it may be called “human.” The disciplines that treat of the nature, origin, and end of the human being and his position in the cosmos, those that pertain to the management of human life, and even prescriptive sciences and ethics may in this respect be designated as “human.” Naturally, such sciences as logic and pure mathematics–whose subjects are absolutely unrelated to the human being–would be excluded from the scope of human science, although their methodology is not empirical. (Mathematics, though derived from experience, relies on an analytic rather than empirical methodology.)

On the other hand, many of the disciplines that are currently recognized as human sciences are in fact not science; they are really crafts combined with science. Accounting, for instance, is considered a member of the human sciences, for it includes educational aspects as well. But, if we are truly willing to stand by this criterion, driving and learning the pertinent skills must also be granted the title of science, for it involves mechanical and physical formulae and laws.

Moreover, a number of the disciplines of the human sciences consist of contractual and legislative disciplines such as law, which concerns conventional rules and regulations. Although such disciplines relate to human action, they have been set apart from the crafts and counted among the sciences.

The above analysis should suffice to show that the amalgam of human sciences is composed of diverse members that have been brought together for a variety of different reasons. Thus, in order to define the human sciences accurately, we must first make up our mind as to the criterion that renders a science “human.” If we wish to retain the bifurcation of science into human and non–human, the designation naturally requires that the subject–matter of the human sciences should in some way involve the human being: the human being–his soul and values–ought to constitute the object of their inquiries, studying his needs and concerns. (We say the human being should constitute their object, for at the subjective level, all sciences are obviously in need of the human being.) By contrast, those sciences whose subject–matter does not pertain to the human soul are not human.

 Interviewers:

Dr. Mohammad Fanaei, PhD in Philosophy of Religion, Full professor of Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute

Dr. Ali Mesbah, Doctor of Philosophy of Religion, Associate Professor of Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute

Dr. Mahmoud Namazi Esfahani, PhD in Philosophy of Religion, Assistant Professor of Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute